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Caste and Class in Higher Education Enrolments
Challenges in Conceptualising Social Inequality
Amman Madan
The National Sample Survey 2014 data is used to explore 
the character of class inequality, over and beyond that of 
caste. The caste break-up of various social classes 
suggests that caste inequalities are greater amongst the 
more educated classes. Enrolments in higher education 
show greater social inequalities than in elementary 
education. The differences amongst various classes 
suggest that while caste is a strong factor in educational 
inequality, it is not a sufficient one. There is much less 
caste variation within the lower classes than the higher 
classes. Caste and class need to be seen as generative 
processes, and sub-jati networks are to be 
conceptualised and empirically examined to understand 
the actual roles of caste and class in educational and 
social inequality. 
This paper was presented in seminars at the School of Education, 
Azim Premji University and School of Education, Tata Institute of 
Social Sciences. Comments and questions received are gratefully 
acknowledged.
Amman Madan (ammanm@gmail.com) teaches at the Azim Premji 
University, Bengaluru. 
The way in which we theorise social life has played a key role in understanding and addressing the challenges to human dignity and freedom. The theorising of social in-
equality has made important contributions to the struggle to 
create an open education system by conceptually guiding our 
interventions, ranging from caste-based reservations to the 
development of inclusive forms of teaching, amongst others. 
This paper will examine two out of the several ways of concep-
tualising social inequality—caste and class—which are well 
known for their limiting and corrupting infl uences on meritoc-
racy and the education system. 
In the popular and public culture, we are seeing a broad 
shift from a time when class used to dominate discussions of 
inequality to a situation where class has mostly disappeared 
from the conceptual armoury. Gender and caste are the 
issues most prominent in our imagination these days, parti-
cularly amongst anti-caste voices. This shift is, in part, an 
important corrective to the study of social inequality, which 
was earlier dominated by the discourse of class and redistri-
bution. The importance of identity and culture in shaping 
social structures and the injustices inbuilt within them is 
now better recognised. On the other hand, there is the 
danger of ignoring social structures and processes that lie 
at a deeper level and are not part of the self-identity of 
mobilised or oppressed groups. There are many kinds of 
relations of exploitation and oppression between labour, 
political organisation and capital, which may or may not 
be part of the consciously articulated categories of the 
people involved. 
Karl Marx had distinguished between class-in-itself and 
class-for-itself as structural and ideological entities. The very 
notion of ideology suggests that our knowledges and cultures 
are politically charged, and certain articulations may get 
suppressed at the cost of others. There may be structural ine-
qualities that are present but do get clearly articulated, given 
the power relations of a historical moment. The search for 
social structures, which are not part of our contemporary the-
oretical apparatus but do lead to social inequality, is thus a 
struggle to overcome hegemonic ideologies. This makes an 
important contribution to the struggle for a more open and 
free society. Such structures must be deliberately searched 
for and analytically exhumed since our cultures and the ide-
ologies we live in may not fully recognise them. Evidence 
must then be looked at with new lenses to see if it supports 
the reworked concepts. 
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There may be many structures that escape our current 
ideologies and which the terms of class, caste, and gender 
only inadequately represent. The term “intersectionality” 
has become a common way of fl agging that there are many 
kinds of social inequality and they interact with each other 
in complicated ways. These may reinforce or sometimes 
even neutralise each other. We are increasingly aware that we 
need to conceptualise class, caste, gender, etc, not just indi-
vidually but in terms of their interaction with each other. A 
system of social inequality may be said to be a unique 
and discernible system to the extent that its elements are 
integrated in a way that is different from other possible 
systems. The idea of intersectionality asks us to question that 
purportedly separate and watertight existence of systems of 
inequality. It emphasises that even when systems appear to 
be distinct, there may be elements that are shared across 
them, and the systems themselves may collide and collude in 
complicated ways. 
While there is a good amount of work nowadays on the 
interweaving of caste and patriarchy (for example, Dube 1996; 
Devika et al 2013; Guru 1995; Rege 1998), this paper wants to 
draw attention to the ways in which class and caste are 
connected, and yet represent two distinct social processes. 
There is considerable scholarly work on this connectedness 
(for example, Beteille 2007; Ghurye 1957; Mukherjee 1999; 
Sharma 1984). This paper aims to spell out certain empirical 
dimensions that often go unnoticed and uncommented upon. 
Apart from their intrinsic value, they may also help us see in 
perspective recent moves for quotas for the poor amongst 
“upper” castes. Demands for reservations for economically 
weaker sections appear to eschew questions of evidence and 
understanding. This paper may help us to see better the com-
plex and intersectional character of social inequality in India.
Secondary data available in the 71st round of the National 
Sample Survey (NSS), conducted in 2014, which had education 
as one of its specifi c focus areas, is examined so as to estimate 
the connections between educational inequality and contending 
ways of theorising systems of social inequality. Enrolments 
provide a simple, though thin, way of measuring educational 
inequality. The distribution of households and enrolments has 
been studied across various caste groupings on which data 
was gathered by the NSS. Due to limitations of space, the 
patterns to be seen in the expenditure made on education 
and enrolments in English-medium institutions will not be 
discussed here, but they show a similar pattern as that of 
overall enrolments. 
The data has been examined through the statutory caste 
categories as defi ned by the Constitution and through class 
categories that have been operationalised in terms of monthly 
per capita consumption expenditure groups and as occupa-
tional groups, drawing from the work of Erik Olin Wright 
(1996) and John Goldthorpe (2000). Through such an analysis, 
a nuanced answer is sought to be given to the question of 
whether and how we need to think beyond caste when we try 
to understand and engage with educational inequality. This 
paper will argue eventually that we must take class inequality 
seriously, since caste is unable to explain a substantial part of 
the social inequality in society and education in India. It will 
also argue for combining the varna–jati model of caste with a 
model of caste as smaller kinship networks, which operate 
nested within a large system of secular economic, cultural and 
political inequality.
Caste Composition of Classes
We should acknowledge right at the outset the diffi culties 
with data sets that use categories like Scheduled Castes (SCs), 
Scheduled Tribes (STs), Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and 
forward castes. These do not correspond closely with either the 
varna scheme or the pattern of dominant castes of a specifi c 
region. Within each category, there is a wide range of jatis, 
parti cularly so in the OBCs and the forward castes. Yet, if we 
want to look at the large-scale data sets, this is the kind of 
data that is available in most of them. It is with caution that 
we must interpret what they tell us about the caste system. 
Table 1: Over-under-representation of Particular Categories in Different Economic Classes
Class  % of STs in Class Over/Under- % of SCs in Class Over/Under- % of OBCs in Class Over/Under- % of Forward Over/Under-
   representation   representation  representation  Castes In Class representation
Total Population 9.5  19.0  42.7  28.8 
I  Owners, chief executives 4.8 0.5 10.4 0.5 42.5 1.0 42.3 1.5
II  Managers, elected representatives, 
 professionals, professors 4.4 0.5 10.1 0.5 33.9 0.8 51.6 1.8
III  Lower ranking educated workers, 
 school teachers, clerks, nurses, 
 technical assistants, astrologers 6.4 0.7 14.3 0.8 36.7 0.9 42.6 1.5
IV  Unskilled workers: Shop assistants, 
 housekeeping, restaurant workers, 
 protective services, street vendors, 
 domestic workers, messengers, porters 9.2 1.0 23.3 1.2 40.4 0.9 27.1 0.9
V  Farmers 14.2 1.5 13.2 0.7 44.2 1.0 28.4 1.0
VI  Animal husbandry and farming 8.9 0.9 10.8 0.6 57.7 1.4 22.6 0.8
VII  Forestry workers, fishing, hunting, 
 agricultural workers 13.4 1.4 32.7 1.7 41.1 1.0 12.7 0.4
VIII  Skilled workers, crafts, machinery operators, 
 vehicle drivers 6.7 0.7 22.2 1.2 46.1 1.1 25.0 0.9
IX  Unemployed, unknown 7.9 0.8 20.9 1.1 52.7 1.2 18.5 0.6
Source: Calculated using data from NSS, 2014.
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The problems with class information are a little less, but 
still considerable. Here, only broad-brush conclusions are 
being drawn from them and they appear to be valid for 
such kind of data. 
The STs make up 9.5% of the households included in the 
survey, while the SCs are 19.0%. The OBCs are the largest 
single category with 42.7% of all the households. The forward 
castes are a little more than a quarter, that is, 28.8% of the 
surveyed households. The impact of caste identity as a process 
of social inequality can be seen from Table 1 (p 41), which 
depicts the over- or under-representation of particular cate-
gories in different economic classes. That caste has an impact 
on social inequality is supported by this table. Perhaps, the 
most powerful occupational group as extracted from the data 
may be said to be Class I, the owners and chief executives of 
businesses, and Class II who are elected representatives and 
upper white-collar workers, including managers, professionals, 
academics, and so on. 
The owners and chief executives make up a somewhat 
heterogeneous group, since the data does not permit easy 
separation of the owners of tiny one-person businesses from 
those of large businesses. However, even with this hetero-
geneity, just 4.8% of the households reporting the ownership 
or control of businesses as their main occupation are from 
the STs, which is 0.5 times the number that should have been 
there if there were no systemic inequality (that is, instead 
of 4.8%, they should have been the same as the proportion of 
ST in the population, that is, 9.5%). The SCs are 10.4%, which 
is 0.5 times the number that should have been there without 
any systemic inequality. Meanwhile, the OBCs are 42.5% of 
the group, which is almost the same number that should 
be seen without systemic inequality. The forward castes 
are present in this class in a disproportionately large number. 
They make up 42.3% of this group, which means they 
are over-represented 1.5 times compared to their number in 
the population. Caste clearly continues to have an impact 
upon who is the most wealthy and powerful in this country, 
though it would not be accurate to say that it is the only 
determinant at work. 
The poorest and the least powerful occupational group is 
arguably the Class VII (Table 1) households of landless 
agricultural labourers, forestry workers, fi sherpeople, and 
so on. The STs are 13.4% of these households and are over-
represented 1.4 times compared to what we would have 
expected if there were no systemic inequalities. The SCs are 
32.7% of these households and are over-represented slightly 
more than even the STs, being 1.7 times of what we would 
have expected if there were no systemic inequality. The OBC 
interestingly are a little under-represented, being 41.1% of 
these households. The forward castes are 12.7% of these 
households and are strongly under-represented, being only 
0.4 times what we would have expected if there were no 
systemic inequality. Caste seems to have a substantial impact 
even upon who is at the bottom of the class structure. 
Another social class, which may be considered one of 
the most powerful in the country, is that of the upper educated 
workers. This includes managers, professionals, senior gov-
ernment employees, professors, and so on. It shows a distri-
bution pattern similar to that of owners but is a little more 
skewed in favour of the forward castes. While amongst own-
ers, the forward castes were over-represented by 1.5 times, 
amongst the upper educated workers, they are 1.8 times to 
their number in the population. A little over half of all house-
holds reporting this class (51.6%) come from the forward 
castes. In other words, caste skews who gets into the upper 
classes and being from an “upper” caste shows the greatest 
impact upon the membership of that particular class which is 
directly shaped by education.
Interestingly, caste seems to be showing the least impact 
(though it is discernible there as well) upon those who are 
only slightly above the bottom, namely the unskilled workers in 
occupations that are typically urban and do not require much 
schooling (Class IV). The ratio of over/under-representation 
for the STs/SCs/OBCs/forward castes is 1.0, 1.2, 0.9, 0.9, 
respectively in this class. A slightly greater impact of the 
caste system may be seen in the membership of skilled urban 
workers (Class VIII in Table 1). 
So it is amongst the most powerful and the most powerless 
that caste seems to speak the loudest. Amongst classes that are 
formed by hereditary economic capital, like those of owners 
and farmers, it does not surprise us that caste inequality has a 
pronounced impact. After all, caste is about inheriting privi-
lege. But education has often been pitched as a way of equalis-
ing society, as a way of creating human capital where economic 
capital cannot be redistributed. That caste inequalities amongst 
the educated classes appear to be even more than the proper-
tied classes raises diffi cult questions.
Caste and Educational Enrolments 
This connection between caste and the educated classes leads 
us to look at the relation between caste and educational enrol-
ments. Unfortunately, the NSS data does not differentiate be-
tween enrolments in better or worse kind of institutions, 
where intensive and stimulative teaching takes place versus 
where there is only mechanical teaching and where learning 
occurs on paper alone. We may expect that the more advan-
taged will be present in larger numbers in the better kind 
of educational institutions. Be that as it may, with all their 
limitations, the NSS data tells us that the gap between different 
caste categories is rather low in elementary school enrolments 
(Table 2). The separation between the STs and the forward 
castes is just 6.4 percentage points. This is no doubt the 
result of concerted efforts by governments around India to 
improve school enrolments. However, we cannot say from 
Table 2: Caste-wise Enrolment amongst Different Age Groups  (%)
 STs SCs OBCs Forward Castes All
School enrolment amongst 
6–14-year-old 88.4 90.9 92.0 94.7 92.08
School enrolment amongst 
15–17-year-old 62.5 66.7 71.7 80.4 62.5
Tertiary education enrolment 
amongst 18–21-year-old 15.7 20.8 28 39.5 28.5
Source: NSS, 2014.
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this table whether the gap is the same in the better schools 
or is larger there. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that the gap begins to widen as one move to schools 
with better teaching and learning. 
When we look at progressively higher kinds of education, 
the gap begins to further widen. 39.5% of the forward castes in 
the age group of 18–21 are enrolled in some kind of tertiary 
education, while only 28% of the OBCs are enrolled. The enrol-
ment rate drops even more drastically with the SCs (20.8%) 
and the STs (15.7%). Thus, disparity amongst the caste groups 
is much sharper in tertiary education than elementary. Again, 
we cannot say from this data what is happening in elite institu-
tions; we do not know if the differences are greater there than 
in humbler colleges and polytechnics. 
We should connect this observation of the sharpest caste 
disparities being in higher education with the previous obser-
vation that the inequalities of caste are expressed the most in 
non-agrarian occupations that recruit on the basis of higher 
education degrees. This is quite an important thing to note. 
Caste inequality is greater in higher education than in other 
sectors, in spite of many years of efforts to make education a 
site for the equalisation of castes. This frustrating observation 
reminds us of the importance of questions regarding the 
nature of the caste system: how is it practised, and why is it 
that it shows such a strong impact upon education in spite of 
all the years of reservations?
Caste and Inequality
The discussion so far has been in line with what is already well 
known, that, caste patterns substantially reinforce class ine-
quality. However, this data can also be read to show that there 
is a considerable divergence between class and caste locations. 
To begin with, it should be pointed out that only a small num-
ber (a little over a third) of the forward castes are enrolled in 
tertiary education. It is not as if the forward castes are a group 
of castes that is completely saturated with higher education. 
The fact that almost two-thirds of the forward castes are not 
enrolling or are dropping out of tertiary education is striking. 
It suggests that while caste matters for enrolments, again 
there is something else that is at play, which is generating a 
pattern of dropouts and enrolments. The presence of a rela-
tively small number of forward-caste enrolments does not fi t 
very well into a “caste directly leads to educational inequality” 
kind of view. 
There is undoubtedly a dwindling proportion of STs, SCs, 
and OBCs within the upper levels of the Indian population, and 
these caste groups are present in increasing proportions as we 
look at the lower classes. But the story is more than this. The 
overall class structure and the presence of different caste 
groups within each class is better understood by looking at the 
data presented in terms of its proportions within the entire 
population and not just as percentages within a particular 
class. It nudges us to rethink the role of class and other social 
processes in the structure of social stratifi cation and their 
roles in the challenge of building a meritocracy. Table 3 
shows the relative numbers of different caste groups within 
each class, calculated as a weighted percentage of the entire 
sample (also in Figure 1). This is a better mapping and repre-
sentation of different castes and classes in India. Again, we can 
see that caste undoubtedly seems to infl uence class inequality. 
But what also comes out clearly is that a substantial number of 
the poor cannot be said to be from the lower ranking castes. 
A signifi cant aspect of the Indian class structure is that the 
owners and the higher and lower educated workers, all 
together make up less than a fi fth of the total population. 
As the preferred destination for upward mobility, this is a 
rather small platform onto which vast numbers are seeking to 
climb. The ladder to get here goes partially through educa-
tion, ranging from elementary to tertiary levels. Those who 
wish to get into these classes fi nd that the odds are stacked 
strongly against them. The window into this platform is 
rather small and getting through it calls for a lot of agility. As 
can be seen through the preceding discussion, the castes of 
one’s ancestors are clearly one factor that seems to aid or 
hinder that movement.
However, it is diffi cult to say that caste alone is at play. The 
proportions of various caste groups in the poorest classes, un-
skilled non-agrarian workers (Class IV) and agrarian, fi shery, 
forestry workers (Class VII) tell an interesting story (Table 3). 
Table 3: Relative Numbers of Different Caste Groups within Each Class
Class  STs SCs OBCs Forward Class
     Castes Total
I Owners, chief executives 0.3 0.7 3.1 3.0 7.2
II  Managers, elected representatives, 
 professionals, professors 0.3 0.6 2.1 3.2 6.3
III  Lower ranking educated workers, 
 school teachers, clerks, nurses, 
 technical assistants, astrologers 0.3 0.8 1.9 2.2 5.3
IV  Unskilled workers: Shop assistants, 
 housekeeping, restaurant workers, 
 protective services, street vendors, 
 domestic workers, messengers, porters 1.6 4.1 7.1 4.8 17.6
V  Farmers 3.9 3.6 12.0 7.7 27.2
VI  Animal husbandry and farming 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.9
VII  Forestry workers, fishing, hunting, 
 agricultural workers 2.0 4.9 6.1 1.9 14.9
VIII  Skilled workers, crafts, 
 machinery operators, vehicle drivers 1.3 4.5 9.3 5.0 20.2
IX  Unemployed, unknown 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5
Caste total 9.5 19.0 42.7 28.8 
Source: Calculated using data from NSS, 2014.
Figure 1:  Caste Specific Numbers within Each Class
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The numbers of the STs and SCs are disproportionately large, 
of course. But the numbers of the OBCs and even the forward 
castes are quite large amongst these poorest classes. The SCs 
in Classes III and VIII (the majority of uneducated manual 
workers) is 9% of all Indian households. This, of course, is 
a disproportionately high representation of them in these 
classes. On the other hand, the forward castes who are in 
these classes are not a tiny number either, being 6.7% of all 
Indian households. The number is so large that we cannot 
accept a simple equation of caste with class. A more compli-
cated statement is called for.
The numbers of households of the forward castes from the 
upper and lower educated classes (Classes II and III) at 5.4% of 
the total households are actually lower than their numbers of 
households from the uneducated manual workers (Classes IV 
and VII), which are 6.7% of the total. In other words, there 
are more forward castes in the poorest classes than in the 
educated classes. If caste alone were responsible for the class 
location, we would not have seen such a pattern. 
Dropouts 
It is hardly surprising if the inequalities within a social struc-
ture also carry on to infl uence its education system. The 
reverse is also true; efforts within the education system to 
increase access and to create more inclusive curricula and 
pedagogies may have a balancing infl uence on the stratifi ca-
tion system. There are limits to what can be achieved through 
education alone, of course. But it is important to acknowledge 
that the education system has a relative autonomy and deserves 
attention in itself, and not just as a mirror image of the rest of 
the social structure.
Enrolments provide a thin though still a useful way of 
examining stratifi cation. I have examined the differences 
within enrolments in tertiary education institutions elsewhere 
using the 66th NSS survey and will not go into great detail of 
that again (Madan 2020). It will suffi ce to recall from it that 
there are strong caste as well as class patterns in enrolments 
into tertiary education. In certain streams like engineering, 
the ratio of forward castes to SC students is of the order of 11:1. 
In streams like medicine, commerce, and arts, it is closer 
to 3:1 (Madan 2020). Within each stream and caste group, 
there is a further infl uence of class. For instance, amongst 
SC engineering undergraduates, more than half are from the 
educated and owner classes. 
In this section, I look not at who is enrolled, but at who 
is left out. Overall enrolments have improved tremendously 
in India. In 2014, the year of the 71st survey, 60.5% of all 
individuals between the ages of 18−21 were enrolled in 
some kind of school or college. Out of these, 28.5% were 
enrolled in tertiary education. A study of who dropped out 
or never enrolled, however, will give us a clearer picture of 
how social stratifi cation operates to obstruct the functioning 
of a meritocracy. Table 4 shows the individuals between 
the age group of 15−17 who have been reported as having 
dropped out or never enrolled. Here, we will use “dropout” as 
a shorthand for dropout and never enrolled. When we look 
at the dropouts as a whole, there is a visible gradient 
between the forward castes, with a dropout rate of 19.63%, 
and the other caste groups. There is a substantial gap 
between the forward castes and the OBC, with the latter at a 
dropout rate of 28.33%. There is a slightly narrower gap 
between the OBCs and the SCs (33.3%) and STs (37.54%). The 
STs have a dropout rate of nearly twice as that of the forward 
castes. Caste clearly has a role to play in who drops out in 
secondary school.
Looking at the data by clustering it around the family’s 
monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE), however, 
puts things in a somewhat different light. We now begin to 
see the relation of dropouts and non-enrolments with class 
as well as caste. Among 15−17-years-old, the forward castes 
in the poorest MPCE band of less than `1,000 have a dropout 
rate (42.59%), which is hardly distinguishable from the OBCs 
(41.39%) and the SCs (43.12%). Only the STs are signifi cantly 
worse off-with a dropout rate of 48.3%. But, the overall differ-
ence amongst the poorest in terms of consumption is much less 
than the average overall difference across different MPCE 
bands. The different caste groups are much closer amongst 
the poor than amongst those slightly better off. The dropout 
rate declines sharply with an increase in the family’s ability 
to consume. Unfortunately, the fi gures reported in the survey 
are too small to draw any reliable conclusion on the compari-
son across castes in the higher consumption bands. But the 
gap does seem to reduce with decreasing family income. 
Overall, it can be safely said that low family incomes are a very 
strong contributor to dropouts and non-enrolments across 
each and every caste group. 
The impact of caste amongst the poorest classes is seen to 
strengthen as we go up the ladder of education. The difference 
between the forward castes and the SCs was not tangible in 
the 15−17-years-old, who may be in and about the secondary 
education level, amongst those with an MPCE of less than 
`1,000, but is quite clear in dropouts and non-enrolments 
amongst 18−21-years-old (tertiary education levels) (Table 5). 
However, when we go up the class ladder, there is a dra-
matic decline in dropouts amongst all caste groups. Being poor 
makes a big difference to tertiary education enrolment of not 
Table 5: Dropouts as Percent of Total 18−21-years-old in Each Caste Group
MPCE (`) STs SCs OBCs Forward Castes
0−1,000 84.2 79.17 75.32 73.13
1,000−2,000 68.09 67.63 65.19 59.86
2,000−3,000 45.59 47.89 44.83 41.71
3,000−4,000 17.69 41.43 30.57 25.16
Total 70.61 67.3 60.98 50.1
Source: NSS, 2014.    
Table 4: Dropouts as Percent of Total 15−17-year-old in Each Caste Group
MPCE (`) STs SCs OBCs Forward Castes
0–1,000 48.3 43.12 41.39 42.59
1,000−2,000 32.85 30.86 28.05 20.61
2,000−3,000 13.35 19.84 14.16 9.16
3,000−4,000 0.02 6.41 4.4 5.03
Total 37.54 33.3 28.33 19.63
Source: Calculated using data from NSS, 2014.
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only the SCs and the STs, but also makes quite a large difference 
to the forward castes. Figure 2 shows the absolute numbers of 
dropouts and non-enrolments amongst 18−21-years-old in 
different MPCE bands. It gives a way of comparing the absolute 
numbers of dropouts from different caste groups and classes. 
It may be seen that the absolute numbers of forward-caste 
students who do not enter the tertiary education system are 
not insignifi cant. While the dropouts of the ST and SC are still 
disproportionately larger, the dropouts amongst the forward 
castes are also quite substantial. There is clear evidence of the 
infl uence of caste in educational inequality, but it is not pos-
sible to sustain that caste is the only factor at work.
Regional Variations 
Another way of examining the relation between class and 
caste could be to take up a comparison of less and more 
developed regions and study the dropouts there. In this 
paper, the most and least developed regions of Karnataka are 
compared. The Bengaluru region is a place where rapid growth 
has taken place in recent years. We defi ne this region as made 
up of Bengaluru urban, Bengaluru rural, and the adjacent 
Ramanagara districts. For comparison, the most economically 
backward region in Karnataka was chosen, which is widely 
considered to be Kalyana Karnataka, comprising of the 
districts of Bidar, Kalaburgi, Yadgir, Raichur, and Koppal. 
A marked difference can be seen between the Bengaluru and 
Kalyana Karnataka regions. The dropout levels in Bengaluru 
vary sharply from the STs to the SCs, OBCs, and forward castes 
among 15–21 year old. The STs have drastically high dropouts 
here (70.64%), and the SCs (61.47%) too are dropping out in 
much larger numbers than the OBCs (38.58%) and forward 
castes (31.85%). Interestingly, in the Kalyana Karnataka re-
gion, quite a different picture emerges. While the differences 
between the different caste groups are comparable to the dif-
ferences seen in Bengaluru, the forward castes have a much 
higher dropout rate in Kalyana Karnataka (55.37%) (Table 6). 
The considerable difference in the dropout and non-enrolment 
patterns between Bengaluru and the Kalyana Karnataka 
regions again tells us that we need to complement the analysis 
of caste with some other factors too. The history of a region, its 
pattern of development, and the processes shaping the class 
structure there have a considerable impact upon how caste 
operates in education and society. Perhaps, the way the state 
and various institutions providing education operate also 
infl uences the patterns here. The way we understand social 
inequality and its relation to education has to face the challenge 
of explaining all these variations. 
Alternative Models
A clear caste-based pattern can be seen of inequality in access 
to wealth and resources and also in educational enrolments, 
particularly those of tertiary education. However, there are 
vast disparities within the caste categories themselves and not 
just across them. This forces us to pay attention once again at 
class, gender, regional and other kinds of disparities as sources 
of educational inequality. We have focused here for reasons of 
space on class, since the patterns created by patriarchy and 
historically specifi c forms of development while interconnected 
with class need an elaborate discussion that may be too much 
to take on in this paper. 
The wide range of variation within each caste group 
makes one wonder if we are looking at the right kind of unit 
of caste. A widespread understanding of the caste system has 
been to see it as made up of four varnas plus the excluded 
antyaja. These are said to have been generated through the 
consolidation of different class strata: (i) priests, (ii) warriors, 
(iii) farmers and merchants, (iv) artisans and labourers, and 
(v) the marginalised and conquered people, who are also 
sometimes fused with artisans and labourers. This has been 
compared with the estates of medieval Europe, though there 
are also signifi cant differences between the two. The diver-
gence between this model and the reality of caste in recent 
years has been remarked upon by many scholars (for example, 
Cohn 1987; Dirks 2001; Ghurye 1957; Srinivas 1976). While 
the varna model may have corresponded to the reality of social 
inequality, in some parts of the South Asian region in ancient 
times, migrations and movements of people into different 
territory over the centuries, coupled with social and economic 
upheavals and conquest of groups by one another, have led to 
an emergence of a very different social structure. Scholars like 
S C Dube (1990), M N Srinivas (1976), and G S Ghurye (1957) 
amongst many others have argued that a smaller group, which 
they called the jati or the sub-caste, has become the functional 
unit of caste. The jati is defi ned by being the theoretical popu-
lation within which marriage is permitted, or the endogamous 
unit of this social structure. 
The patterns of wide class disparities within caste catego-
ries reinforce our rejection of the varna theory of caste. It 
cannot explain why, for instance, half of the forward castes 
are not getting into tertiary education. A jati theory of 
caste, which uses varna only to legitimise itself in a changing 
and dynamic way, is much more plausible. The patterns to 
be seen are consistent with the presence of a large number 
of jatis, which may or may not have a close connection with 
Table 6: Dropouts and Non-enrolments in 15−21-years-old  (%)
 STs SCs OBCs Forward Castes
Bengaluru region 70.64 61.47 38.58 31.85
Kalyana Karnataka region 83.9 84.93 62.42 55.37
Source: NSS, 2014.
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varna, but act to support their internal members in a competi-
tive manner. Some of those jati collectives may be placed 
higher in the class and political structure and some placed 
lower. This is consistent with how the above-mentioned 
scholars and many others have documented the way caste 
works in different regions. The most powerful group is the 
dominant jati, and this may not conform to the varna scheme 
of hierarchy. To give just one illustration, in Punjab, the 
dominant jatis a hundred years ago were the Aroras and 
Khatris (erstwhile traders and merchants, technically of the 
Vaishya varna), and now are the Jats (erstwhile farmers, 
technically again of the Vaishya varna). The hold of the varna 
image of caste is partially because dominant groups every-
where fi nd it a convenient ideology to claim a higher varna 
status for themselves. So, nowadays, voices insisting that the 
Khatris and the Jats are “actually” Kshatriyas are getting 
louder. Since there are hardly any Rajputs in Punjab, there is 
no strong resistance to this claim. 
A third model of how caste operates is that of a smaller 
kinship network within the jati. This is also consistent with the 
NSS data, and may actually better explain the wide variations 
within each caste grouping than the jati model alone. The 
government’s classifi cation of SCs, STs, OBCs, forward castes, 
etc, is done on the basis of jatis and not varnas. The marked 
differences to be seen within each of these categories suggest 
that the jati too is more heterogeneous than what was earlier 
thought. Unfortunately, the granularity of the data available 
does not allow us to examine kinship networks in greater de-
tail. The kinship network model was mentioned by scholars 
like the prescient Ghurye (1957) and Bernard Cohn (1987). Ac-
cording to this, the functional unit of caste where support is 
offered, cultures are shared and reproduced, and marriages 
are actually contracted is smaller than the theoretical bound-
ary of the jati. A jati, for instance, may have been spread 
across a large geographical area due to historical migrations. 
Marriages and kinship relations may be maintained only 
within a smaller circle. It is this which then shares the most 
immediate advantages and disadvantages of caste identity, 
not the jati or the varna. 
It is such a network of kinship that Claude Meillasoux had in 
mind when he spoke of many countries of the world being run 
by a lineage-based mode of production (Meillasoux 1973, 
1981). Such a model is quite consistent with the wide range of 
economic disparities that the NSS is reporting within each 
caste category. The variations of the fortunes of smaller 
networks seem actually more plausible than the variations in 
the fortunes of entire jatis altogether. There may also be a 
combination of the jati and the kinship-network model at 
work, with the balance tilting towards the latter as inequali-
ties grow between regions. Conversely, as access to technology 
makes communication more possible, we may expect that 
larger units like jatis may become more cohesive. This may 
explain the relatively greater homogeneity within endogamous 
groups, like those amongst the Tamil Brahmins (Fuller and 
Narsimhan 2010). In contrast, where communication is less 
easy, the better economic and political conditions of some 
families will not translate easily into an improvement of others 
who share the jati name. 
Theories of Inequality
The way we are able to theorise social inequality guides the 
way we may struggle against it. Quite clearly, we need to take 
class inequality very seriously, since without theorising and 
identifying its dynamics, we will not be able to work upon it. 
At the same time, closed kinship networks of the advantaged, 
which sometimes escape the way we commonly label caste, 
are a very real problem for meritocracy. Understanding how 
they work and trying to get closed systems to open up is an 
important challenge. 
It may be better to look at caste and class as generative 
mechanisms rather than to visualise them as frozen categories 
and social morphologies. Such generative mechanisms or 
codes make up the environment within which individuals 
and groups struggle and negotiate through discursive prac-
tices. The approach of looking for generative codes has been 
developed upon by several social theorists and philosophers 
of science, including Pierre Bourdieu (1990), Mary Douglas 
(2001), and Roy Bhaskar (1998). These can be thought of 
as basic underlying principles that unfold into the many sur-
face patterns of social inequality. While inquiring into the 
generative codes, one must also try to understand social ine-
quality in its unique everyday character, and pay attention to 
the narratives and meanings constructed by actors through 
which they make sense of and combat and negotiate with 
social structure. 
People are not puppets in the hands of generative codes; 
they also refl ect and create ideas and practices that may chal-
lenge or reinforce them. To understand the challenges inher-
ent in trying to create a meritocracy, we need to look at both 
structure and agency together, not just one of the two. This is 
not a positivistic search for timeless universal laws. Instead, it 
is a search for structural processes that help us understand 
how historical trends move. This is the sense in which some 
people have interpreted Marxist and Weberian traditions and 
have sought to use concepts like capitalism and rationalisation 
Through EPW Engage, 
our new digital initiative, we seek to
explore new and exciting possibilities
of communicating research in a
creative and accessible manner
to a wider audience.
www.epw.in/engage
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  july 25, 2020 vol lV no 30 47
as historical generative processes to understand growing pat-
terns and contradictions of our times.
The work of Meillasoux (1973, 1981) and Anand Chakravarti 
(2001) can be seen as standing within this approach of seeing 
caste and class as generative processes. They argue that caste 
operates as a form of social reproduction that can be alive 
within larger systems, like those of capitalism. Anthropologists 
like Maurice Godelier (1986) argue that kinship systems are a 
way of organising a society. As Meillasoux put it, they may form a 
lineage mode of production that is organised around lines of 
descent and marriage. The networks of descent and marriage 
operate as a core organisational component of production. 
Caste networks can thus be seen as one way of reproducing the 
organisational bases of production. In many parts of India, to-
day educational strategies and institutions play a key role in 
this social reproduction and also contribute to changing the 
ways in which the larger system seeks to reproduce itself. They 
therefore become an important site for struggles by various 
social groups to enhance their power and prestige. 
Caste and sub-caste networks operate to gather status, 
power, and wealth, within historically changing and specifi c 
environments. The character of these environments has, in 
recent years, been shaped by the Indian state, by capitalism 
and universalising processes of rationalisation and differen-
tiation. Endogamous networks give advantages for economic 
and educational activities, but those are no longer the only 
way to gain advantages for individuals and families. Caste 
identities have become only one out of several resources 
within the larger system being constituted by specifi c state-
capitalist formations. It is important to try and understand 
the broader character of social inequality. It is contributed to 
but not completely shaped by caste. It should also be kept in 
mind that there is a great deal of regional specifi city in social 
inequality, and we need to see the way kinship networks play 
out in different situations. 
Caste should be seen as a status group operating within 
larger political and economic systems. The salience and 
strength of a local status group will depend upon how it nego-
tiates with local conditions. The more powerful caste group-
ings within the Bengaluru region are able to achieve a greater 
disparity in education from the rest than the disparities to 
be seen in education in Kalyana Karnataka. The variations 
across different regions suggest that the character of the 
larger systems of production and politics play a crucial role in 
shaping educational inequality, and it is not suffi cient to 
explain it by referring to the reproduction of caste alone. The 
salience or otherwise of a local status group is infl uenced by 
the processes of class, politics, and culture (including kin-
ship). Caste does not work as a nationwide varna but more as 
a regional jati and as a smaller set of kinship networks too 
that vary from region to region. The identities they give them-
selves may or may not correspond exactly with the actual func-
tioning of the networks.
It is necessary, therefore, to try and understand the chang-
ing political economic conditions which lead different caste 
networks to benefi t or not benefi t from them. Those do not 
follow the logic of caste but have a logic shaped by political 
democracy and by the capitalism-state alliance. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to try and outline what those genera-
tive mechanisms are. The point being made here is a relatively 
smaller one: if we wish to understand what obstructs merito-
cracy and what are the ways of creating a society where people 
are indeed able to fl ourish without being held back by social 
structure, we need to understand not just one but several 
different kinds of generative mechanisms. In schools and uni-
versities, we need to better understand how social networks 
operate and how they negotiate with the larger institutional, 
economic, political, social, and cultural environment. It is then 
that we will be able to better intervene so as to create a more 
level-playing ground for everyone. 
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